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ABSTRACT: The notion of credit plays a central role in virtue epistemology and in the literature on 
moral worth. While virtue epistemologists and ethicists have devoted a significant amount of work to 
provide an account of creditable success, a unified theory of credit applicable to both epistemology and 
ethics, as well as a discussion of the general form it should take, are largely missing from the literature. 
Our goal is to lay out a theory of credit that seems to underlie much of the discussion in virtue 
epistemology, which we dub the Cake Theory. We argue that given the goals that virtue epistemologists 
and ethicists who discuss moral worth have, this theory is problematic, for it makes credit depend on 
the wrong facts. 
  
1.      INTRODUCTION 
The central theme of Ernest Sosa’s Epistemic Explanations is that epistemic normativity is telic. That 
is, epistemic normativity is the normativity of epistemic attempts as epistemic attempts, and epistemic 
normativity is thus insulated from non-epistemic considerations, such as whether the attempt is morally 
impeccable. In virtue epistemology, as in virtue ethics, the normative standing of performances is 
explained in terms of the agent’s properties such as whether a relevant success issues from a competence 
or virtue seated in the agent. The most important normative standing in telic virtue theory is the fully 
creditable success Sosa (forthcoming, p. 24). A success is creditable to an agent just in case the agent 
succeeds sufficiently through competence (Sosa, forthcoming, p. 19). In Sosa’s terminology, a success 
that is sufficiently due to competence is labeled apt. One of the central tenets and applications of the 
performance normative framework is a view of knowledge as creditable true belief.  
Virtue epistemologists think of credit as attributability. If a success is creditable to an agent, then the 
success is attributable to the agent and hence, the agent is responsible for it. What is the relation of such 
attributability to evaluations of praise and blame? It is widely accepted that responsibility is intricately 
tied with being eligible for responses such as praise and blame: We can, in principle, be properly praised 
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and blamed only for actions and successes that we are responsible for.1 Indeed, Sosa (forthcoming p. 
163) himself says that “At the core of [telic] assessment are questions of credit and blame, and of 
responsibility even of the sort that involves only attributability and not necessarily accountability.”2 
While Sosa does not say very much about responsibility, we take his talk of responsibility (in the sense 
of attributability) at face value.3 
Given a telic framework, it is plausible that there are performance-domain specific kinds of praise and 
blame, and, correspondingly, domain specific kinds of responsibility. For instance, a person can in 
principle be praised for a murder, qua perfect murder, while being morally blamed for the murder. We 
return to the connections between credit, attributability, praise and blame in several places below. 
The notion of credit plays at least three important theoretical roles in virtue epistemology. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, credit is used to explain the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with 
belief that is merely true by luck. Virtue epistemologists see the relevant kind of luck as intricately 
connected with credit: the more a cognitive success is due to good luck, the less it is creditable to the 
agent; and the more creditable it is, the less it is due to luck (Sosa, forthcoming, pp. 19, 22). Given that 
in Gettier-cases the subject believes the truth in large part due to good luck (Zagzebski, 1994), virtue 
epistemologists draw on the notion of credit to solve the Gettier-problem. 
Second, virtue epistemologists appeal to the notion of credit to explain why knowledge has added value 
over mere true belief. Some virtue epistemologists maintain that creditable  successes constitute 
achievements, and that achievements are finally valuable. Since knowledge is creditable true belief, it 
is an epistemic achievement (Greco, 2010, pp. 97-98; Sosa, forthcoming, p. 19). Assuming 
achievements to have added value over mere successes, it follows that knowledge is more valuable than 
mere true belief. But as Sosa aptly points out, one can earn telic credit for a success without the success 
being in any sense valuable: “A shot might be a “perfect” murder, including its excellence as a shot, 
and thus creditable to its agent, while constituting an abominable crime, to the agent’s moral discredit” 
(Sosa, forthcoming, p. 20). This passage is revealing, since it opens up another way in which the notion 
of credit could help virtue epistemologists solve the Meno problem. The thought is that by deserving 
                                               
1 See, for instance, Smith (2015, p. 106). 
2 Though he does not say so, we suspect Sosa has in mind something like the distinction between two senses of 
responsibility (attributability and accountability) made by Watson (1996). 
3 J. Adam Carter notes in correspondence that telic assessments are applicable even to lower-level animals which 
intuitively fall outside appropriate responsibility attributions, and that this complicates the relationship between 
responsibility and telic credit. First, we would not rule out the possibility that a lower-level animal could be 
responsible (in the sense of attributability) for events. Second, most of our criticisms target the idea that telic credit 
is necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, for responsibility, an idea which we assume Sosa to endorse. 
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credit for attaining an aim one in some way taps into the value of that aim. If the aim itself is 
commendable, then the credit for the success that one deserves has a positive valence - for instance, a 
morally positive value. If the aim is deplorable, the credit has a negative value. While truth is sometimes 
worse than useless from a practical point of view, it is not uncommon to think that it is nevertheless 
finally valuable. Thus, the added value that knowledge has over mere true belief would be achieving 
something finally valuable through one’s cognitive agency. Note, however, that this way of solving the 
value problem, unlike one appealing to the final value of achievements, is premised on the value of 
truth.4   
Third, the notion of credit plays a unique role in Sosa’s virtue epistemology. Sosa holds that knowledge 
comes in three varieties: animal knowledge, reflective knowledge (full well), and secure knowledge (full 
well). The hierarchy of these different grades of knowledge is ordered in terms of the degree to which 
a success (truth or aptness) is creditable to the agent. In the case of animal knowledge one believes truly 
through a first-order competence and hence, is creditable for believing truly. But animal knowledge is 
still susceptible to a kind of credit-reducing luck, since being creditable for believing truly - at least to 
the extent required for animal knowledge - doesn’t entail being creditable for believing aptly. In the 
case of reflective knowledge full well the aptness of the true belief is due to a meta-competence of the 
agent, such that she is sensitive to when her beliefs would be apt, and not just true. As a result, the agent 
is credited not only for believing truly, but also for believing aptly. On the ultimate level of secure 
knowledge one attains reflective knowledge full well, and the attainment of this knowledge derives 
from competences that are retained securely, and not just accidentally. One has secure knowledge only 
if one is safe from losing one’s competence to judge correctly while retaining a disposition to judge. If 
one’s knowledge is unsecure one could easily have formed a belief without possessing the relevant 
epistemic competence (Sosa, forthcoming, pp. 161, 175-176). We return to this hierarchy in §5: as we 
will see, Sosa’s thought seems to be that as one ascends the knowledge hierarchy, it’s not just that one 
deserves credit for different successes, but that one deserves more credit for one’s true belief. 
Though the two literatures have been for the most part isolated, it is worth noting that the notion of 
credit also plays an important role in the literature on moral worth. The following thought is widely 
accepted in that literature: a morally right action is morally worthy just in case the agent deserves 
sufficient credit for doing the right thing. This points to a parallel between virtue epistemological views 
of knowledge and views of moral worth. Just like knowledge, moral worth requires success (doing the 
right thing) that is not merely lucky or accidental. If the agent deserves sufficient credit for doing the 
right thing, then it is not a mere accident that they did the right thing. Hence, like virtue epistemologists, 
                                               
4 Baehr (2012) argues that some true beliefs lack any positive value and hence this way of explaining the added 
value of knowledge doesn’t pan out. 
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those writing on moral worth contrast creditable success (morally right action) with success that is lucky 
or accidental.5 
But how should we understand credit itself, and is there a single notion that could serve us both in 
epistemology and in ethics? In §2 we lay out one way of thinking about  the structure of credit, which 
we call the Cake Theory of credit, that seems to underlie much of current virtue epistemic theorizing. 
In §3-§5 we examine different ways in which virtue epistemologists could endorse the central tenets of 
the Cake Theory - in particular, different views of what grounds degrees of credit. In §6 we argue that 
the Cake Theory is problematic and consider possible replies on behalf of virtue theorists. In §7 we 
conclude by laying out some desiderata that theories of credit ought to satisfy. 
 
2.      THE CAKE THEORY OF CREDIT  
In this section we formulate the bare bones of a theory of credit that seems to underlie much of virtue 
epistemic theorizing. 
                                               
5 The idea that the kind of luck at issue is the same in the two cases is at least worth exploring, due to the theoretical 
unification that could be achieved. Sliwa (2016), for instance, understands accidentality in the moral domain as 
the kind of accidentality that is incompatible with knowing. Note further, that the usefulness of a unified account 
of credit and attributable success across ethics and epistemology is not premised on a view of knowledge as 
creditable true belief. One might, for instance, hold that though the relevant success in ethics is doing the right 
thing, in epistemology it is knowledge, not true belief. On such a view one might know, even if the knowledge is 
not attributable or creditable to the knower. (Indeed, both of the authors have defended views along these lines; 
see Hirvelä (2018, 2019b) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, forthcoming). 
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Virtue epistemologists understand competences as dispositions to succeed while in certain kind of 
circumstances.6, 7 An epistemic competence, then, is a disposition to attain or retain true beliefs.8 Virtue 
epistemologists have talked about success being “owed to”, “due to”, “in virtue of”, “because of” one’s 
competence, or of one’s competence being “responsible” for the success.9 For now we leave it open just 
what relation between one’s competence and the relevant success such talk picks out, and will use 
“responsible for” to pick out the relation in question. Whatever the relation is, other factors (other 
agents, environmental factors such as random gusts of wind, etc.) can also be responsible for the success 
to various degrees. 
According to the Cake Theory, whether a success is creditable to an agent, full-stop, depends on the 
extent to which the agent’s competence, as opposed to other factors, is responsible for the success: the 
larger the role played by these other factors, the more the success is due to luck. Think of the relevant 
kind of responsibility here as a cake: in any given case, there is only a limited quantity to be had. 
Different factors responsible for the success are assigned pieces of the cake, the sizes of which 
correspond to the degree to which they are responsible for the success. For an agent to be creditable for 
the success, full-stop, her competences must get a big enough slice of the responsibility-cake. The core 
of the theory, then, is the thought that the degree to which a successful performance is creditable to an 
                                               
6 The idea that competences are dispositions to succeed is widely shared among virtue epistemologists (Greco, 
2010; Littlejohn, 2014; Pritchard, 2012). Miracchi (2014, pp. 44-46) is a notable exception since she considers 
competences to be a sui generis property that only subjects (in virtue of having cognitive systems) can have, which 
allow the subject to reliably attain success when exercising the competence in question. Vetter (2016) argues that 
the dispositional account of competences invoked by virtue reliabilists does not give a general account of 
competences, since abilities and dispositions have a different modal structure. 
7 Sosa understands dispositions to be properties characterisable by sets of trigger-manifestation conditionals, 
called SSS-conditionals. An SSS-conditional is a conditional of the form: if X were to host a seat Se of a 
disposition D, while in an appropriate situation Si and shape Sh, and D were triggered, then X would φ. X property 
P is a seat of a disposition D only if X having P would make the relevant SSS-conditionals true of X. To have a 
disposition D, X must have some seat Se of D. Shapes are intrinsic properties. Situations are extrinsic properties. 
The appropriateness of shapes/situations is determined by community interests. (Sosa, 2015, p. 104). Hirvelä and 
Paterson (2021) argue that neither knowledge nor intentional action requires that one possesses competences as 
Sosa conceives them. 
8 Kelp (2017) and Miracchi (2015) hold that the relevant epistemic success is knowledge rather than true belief, 
and hence understand competences as dispositions or propensities to achieve knowledge. Hirvelä (2019b) argues 
that one can know without having the competence to do so. 
9 This placeholder use of “responsible for” should be distinguished from a more substantive sense of 
“responsibility” - indeed, one at play when Sosa cashes out credit in terms of a kind of responsibility - that we 
will also discuss below. 
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agent is a function of how responsible her competence is for the success, compared with other factors: 
degrees of credit are a function of the proportion of the cake assigned to her competence. 
 
The Cake Theory of Credit 
(1) Credit comes in degrees: one can deserve more or less credit for a success.  
(2) The degree to which a success is creditable to an agent A is a function of the degree to which 
A’s competence, as opposed to other factors, is responsible for the success. 
(3) One needs a sufficiently high degree of credit for a success in order to be creditable (full-stop) 
for the success. 
A view along these lines appears to be widely endorsed by virtue epistemologists. Consider, for 
instance, the following passages: 
The success of an attempt is creditable only if sufficiently owed to the agent’s pertinent triple-
S competence. (Sosa, forthcoming, p. 119) 
How much a success is by credit-reducing luck depends on how little it is due to competence. 
Excess of such luck aligns with deficiency of corresponding competence, which reduces or 
blocks relevant “credit” to the agent for the success of their attempt. (Sosa, forthcoming, p. 22) 
[In cases of knowledge] the person derives epistemic credit … that she would not be due had 
she only accidentally happened upon a true belief … The difference … here is the variation in 
the degree to which a person’s abilities, powers, and skills are causally responsible for the 
outcome, believing truly that p. (Riggs, 2002, pp. 93-94, as cited by Greco 2010, p.72) 
When we attribute knowledge to someone we imply that it is to his credit that he got things 
right. It is not because the person is lucky that he believes the truth — it is because of his own 
cognitive abilities. He figured it out, or remembered it correctly, or perceived that it was so. 
(Greco, 2003, p. 123) 
But why exactly are virtue epistemologists committed to the Cake Theory?  
Virtue epistemologists think that knowledge is essentially creditable true belief, and agree that beliefs 
true by luck cannot constitute knowledge.10 As we have seen, virtue epistemologists, along with many 
                                               
10 Many hold that a belief is not true by luck only if it is safe from error in that it could not easily have been false 
(Hirvelä, 2019a; Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010; Pritchard, 2005). Several virtue epistemologists have argued that 
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writing in the moral worth literature, hold that the more a relevant success is due to luck, the less 
creditable it is to the agent, and the more creditable it is to the agent, the less lucky it is. Since a success 
can be more or less lucky, a success can be more or less creditable to an agent. Credit must therefore 
come in degrees. Therefore virtue epistemologists ought to endorse (1).  
As we have seen, virtue epistemologists accept the schematic idea that when a success is creditable to 
an agent, the agent's competences are responsible for the success. Moreover, recall the opposition 
between credit and luck: the more credit, the less luck; the more luck, the less credit. Already inherent 
in the opposition between credit and other, luck-constituting factors, is the idea that one’s competences 
compete with these other factors. If we add the assumption that the degree to which a success is lucky 
is a function of the degree to which factors other than one’s competence are responsible for the success, 
(2) follows.  
It should already be clear why virtue epistemologists accept (3). If a success is in large part due to luck, 
one can earn some credit for the success, but not enough for it to be creditable, full-stop. For instance, 
virtue epistemologists think that knowledge is creditable true belief and excess of good epistemic luck 
is incompatible with knowing: earning only a minimal degree of credit for one’s true belief entails that 
it is too lucky that one believes truly, Gettier-cases being a case in point (Lackey, 2007). Similarly for 
other successes.  
We will now examine different ways in which virtue epistemologists could endorse the central tenets 
of the Cake Theory - in particular, different views of what it takes for an agent’s competences to be 
responsible for a success. 
3. DEGREES OF CREDIT AND CAUSAL RELEVANCE 
Greco (2003, 2010) and Riggs (2002, p. 91) hold that the degree of credit an agent deserves for a success 
is a matter of the causal relevance of the competences of the agent: the degree to which a success is 
causally determined by the competences of the agent (Riggs, 2002), or how salient a factor the 
competences are in a causal explanation of the success (Greco 2010). On this view, the degree of 
creditability of a success to an agent is a direct function of the causal relevance or salience of the 
competences exercised by the agent to attain the success. 
                                               
satisfying a virtue theoretic condition entails satisfying a safety condition (Carter, 2016; Gaultier, 2014; Greco, 
2016; Littlejohn, 2014). Sosa’s relationship to safety has been complicated, but nowadays he holds that knowledge 
entails a kind of safety condition (Sosa, 2015) (see (Greco, 2016) for discussion). However, one of us has argued 
that satisfying the virtue theoretic condition doesn’t entail satisfying the safety condition (Hirvelä, 2020; Hirvelä 
& Paterson, 2021). See also Pritchard (2010). 
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Causal relevance is one way of cashing out the kind of responsibility in terms of which the Cake Theory 
was formulated: one’s competences and other factors compete for causal relevance, and one’s 
competence must get assigned a big enough slice of the relevance cake for the success to be creditable. 
Note that several substantial assumptions are being made here. For one thing, it is assumed that different 
causally relevant factors share a common currency in which their relative contributions can be 
evaluated. But as noted by numerous philosophers of science, such an assumption of a common 
currency is problematic (see e.g. Sober (1988)). 
Perhaps Greco’s view, appealing not to an objective measure of causal relevance, but to the explanatory 
salience of one’s competence, bypasses these worries by avoiding the need for objective comparisons 
of causal powers or relevance (Greco 2003). But causal explanations are notoriously context sensitive. 
The police might deem a car crash to have been caused by excessive speed while city planners might 
hold it to have resulted from difficult traffic patterns (Greco 2010, p. 106). Moreover, both the police 
and the city planners might be correct since they operate in different contexts. Greco (2010) is explicit 
that his way of understanding credit leads to contextualism about knowledge. But note that as a general 
way of cashing out the Cake Theory of credit, such contextualism goes far beyond knowledge. If we 
were to apply Greco’s view to morally worthy action, for instance, we would have to conclude that 
whether or not an action is morally worthy depends on whether the agent’s competence strikes an 
evaluator as a particularly salient part of a causal explanation of her success of doing the morally right 
thing. Praiseworthiness for doing the right thing would itself become highly context-dependent - a 
conclusion we don’t find altogether palatable. 
Setting aside contextualism, Greco’s view is susceptible to other, perhaps more serious, worries. It is a 
version of the Cake Theory: different causal factors compete for explanatory salience, and one’s 
competences must be a particularly salient factor. It is natural to understand the view as one on which 
one’s competences must be the most salient factor, being at least assigned a bigger slice of the salience-
cake than other factors, if not bigger than all the others combined. Below we discuss problems created 
by joint action, but at this point it is helpful to bring up an important line of objection to the idea of 
knowledge as creditable true belief, due to Jennifer Lackey (2007). Consider Lackey’s case Chicago 
Visitor: 
Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain directions to the 
Sears Tower. He looks around, approaches the first adult passerby that he sees, and asks how 
to get to his desired destination. The passer-by, who happens to be a Chicago resident who 
knows the city extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears 
Tower by telling him that it is located two blocks east of the train station. Morris 
unhesitatingly forms the corresponding true belief. (Lackey 2007: 352) 
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Morris acquires knowledge through testimony. But as Lackey points out, what explains why Morris has 
a true belief regarding the whereabouts of the Sears Tower 
has nearly nothing of epistemic interest to do with him and nearly everything of epistemic 
interest to do with the passerby. In particular, it is the passerby’s experience with and 
knowledge of the city of Chicago that explains why Morris ended up with a true belief rather 
than a false belief (Lackey, 2007, p. 194).  
The worry is that given a somewhat normal context, the explanatory contribution of Morris’s 
competence to his success of truly believing is not particularly big or salient and hence, on views like 
Greco’s, Morris cannot be credited for his true belief. Yet, we seem to be dealing with a rather paradigm 
case of knowledge through testimony. Lackey considers a revised theory on which all that is required 
for credit is that one’s cognitive faculties make some explanatory contribution, but points out that the 
resulting view is too weak, for the condition in question holds in Gettier-cases. Hence, the virtue 
epistemologist faces a dilemma: either they cannot adequately deal with Gettier-cases, or they cannot 
accommodate testimonial knowledge. Something has to give. 
Lackey presents the Morris case as a problem for a view on which knowledge is creditable true belief, 
but we think that analogous cases make trouble, in effect, for the Cake Theory of Credit.11 Consider the 
following case: 
Tokyo Metro 
Aino is visiting Tokyo for the first time, and has promised to meet a local friend at the Shibuya 
station at noon. In order to get to the station, Aino must switch metros numerous times. 
Knowing about the complexity of the metro network, Aino leaves ample time to get to Shibuya. 
Once at the station closest to her, she finds herself unable to figure out how to get to Shibuya 
on the basis of the metro maps she sees, so she consults a friendly local for advice on which 
metro to get on first. Over the course of the next 90 minutes, Aino consults over ten friendly 
locals, and finally finds herself at Shibuya, in ample time for the meeting.  
We think that Aino is creditable both for the success of making it to Shibuya station in time, and for 
keeping her promise. For instance, assuming that keeping her promise is the right thing to do, she not 
                                               
11 We should flag that Lackey says not only that it is facts having to do with the testifier that explain Morris’s true 
belief, but that the truth of the belief is not creditable to him. For our dialectical purposes here we are treating the 
case as a problem not for the view that knowledge is creditable true belief, but as a problem for a particular way 
of thinking about credit. Indeed, though neither of us thinks knowledge is creditable true belief, we don’t think 
Chicago Visitor is a counterexample to such a view. 
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only does the right thing, but her action has moral worth. She can be praised for keeping her promise. 
Indeed, we don’t think there is any relevant difference between how creditable Aino is for keeping her 
promise and how creditable she would have been had she walked to the station using a map, doing all 
the navigating on her own. 
Might someone respond, on behalf of Greco, that while Aino is not creditable for making it to the station 
in time, she is nevertheless creditable for keeping her promise, even if the latter requires making it to 
the station in time? Consider explaining why Aino succeeded in keeping her promise, which was 
meeting her friend at the station at noon. It is not difficult to imagine a context in which the contributions 
of the numerous helpful locals are highly salient; indeed, it is largely due to their helpful advice that 
Aino managed to keep her promise. But even within such a context, we don’t see these facts about 
explanatory salience as detracting from moral worth.  
We return to cases like Tokyo Metro below. But a hypothesis already emerging from the discussion so 
far is that factors other than one’s competence being responsible for a success to a high degree need not 
detract from the credit one deserves for the success. 
 
4. CREDIT AND MANIFESTATIONS OF COMPETENCE 
We now turn to consider an alternative way of understanding the ‘responsible for’ -relation. According 
to the manifestation account, an agent’s competence is sufficiently responsible for a success if and only 
if the agent’s competence is manifested in the success (Sosa, 2009, p. 12; forthcoming, pp. 60, 82, 150; 
Turri, 2011, p. 7). Understanding creditability in terms of manifestation of competence rather than in 
terms of causal relevance might have significant benefits. First, while Morris’ competences are not the 
most salient causal explanation as to why he acquired a true, rather than a false belief, his competences 
are manifested in his acquiring a true belief, and hence we can maintain that his cognitive success is 
creditable for him. Second, virtue epistemologists have argued that the true beliefs of Gettiered subjects 
do not manifest their competences, so proponents of the manifestation account may be able to escape 
Lackey’s dilemma (Turri 2011, p. 11). Third, understanding credit in terms of manifestation is elegant, 
since competences are dispositions and dispositions can be manifested. It is at least initially plausible 
to think that a disposition is responsible for an event if that event is a manifestation of the disposition. 
Finally, the manifestation account is not committed to contextualism about credit. 
But one immediate problem for the manifestation account is that it is no longer clear how it can deliver 
the idea that credit comes in degrees. After all, manifesting a disposition is an on/off matter. Either, one 
might think, a shattering is a manifestation of the fragility of a vase or it isn't. In response, one could 
try to argue that dispositions can be manifested to different degrees: for instance, that when stuffed with 
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dynamites, the shattering of the vase manifests its fragility to a lesser degree than when it is dropped on 
a hard surface in somewhat normal conditions. Bradford (2015, p. 110) seems to hold this view since 
she writes that “[o]ne might say that the [success] manifests the competence to the degree that the 
competence is responsible for the [success] (although this is by no means a strict definition).” But note 
that here Bradford helps herself to the notion of competence being responsible for a success in 
explaining degrees of manifesting competence, rather than vice versa: what the virtue epistemologist 
would need is an independent account of degrees of manifesting dispositions. Indeed, it is hard to see 
how this view differs from the causal account, which basically holds that one deserves credit for a 
success if one’s competences are causally responsible for the success. 
Hence, it is worth noting at the outset that prima facie at least, the manifestation account is at odds with 
the Cake Theory, which assumes credit to come in degrees. While the Cake Theory, and especially the 
idea that credit comes in degrees, might be hard to reconcile with the manifestation account, we 
nevertheless take Sosa to be committed to both, as evinced by the quotations given above. We turn to 
explore how Sosa can consistently hold on to both ideas. 
In the past Sosa has advocated the idea that the degree of credit one earns for a success depends on how 
reliable the manifested competence is: “Aptness comes in degrees. One shot is more apt than another, 
for example, if it manifests a more reliable competence.” (2009, p. 13) But what does the reliability of 
a competence amount to? Note at the outset that we cannot understand the reliability of a competence 
as a function of the range of circumstances in which its manifestations are successful - for instance, 
roughly as how often an archer’s competence, when manifested, issues in a successful shot. That is 
because Sosa characterizes competences as dispositions to succeed. But a disposition to succeed cannot 
have unsuccessful manifestations, any more than a disposition to break can have as its manifestations 
non-breakings. As far as we can see, there are two remaining ways in which the reliability of a 
competence could be understood. 
First, a disposition could be said to be reliable to the degree to which it is likely to manifest when 
triggered. That is, setting aside the phenomenon of masking, the higher the chance of the manifestation 
of the disposition is when the stimulus condition is present, the more reliable the disposition is. It would 
follow that if a success manifests a so-called surefire disposition, then the degree of credit one deserves 
for the success is maximal.12 But the resulting view is implausible, for it seems to entail that the degree 
of credit that can be earned for extremely difficult performances is lesser than the degree of credit that 
can be earned for easy performances. After all, difficult performances plausibly often involve deploying 
competences that are less reliable in the sense under discussion. Suppose I have both a competence to 
win in chess against opponents whose rating is 800 and against opponents whose rating is 1600. The 
                                               
12 For a distinction between surefire and probabilistic dispositions, see Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson (1982). 
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latter competence is less reliable in the relevant sense, for it is less likely to manifest when triggered. 
Nevertheless, I need not deserve less credit for winning an opponent whose rating is 1600 than I deserve 
for winning an opponent whose rating is 800 (indeed, the two games may involve identical moves). 
More generally, a probabilistic disposition can be fully responsible for its manifestation, since no 
external factor need contribute to its manifesting. Think for example of an isotope of uranium 238, 
which has a half-life of roughly 4,5 billion years. Within any relatively short interval of time the 
probability that it manifests its disposition to decay is extremely low. Yet, when it does so its disposition 
to decay is fully responsible for its decay, since decaying is a spontaneous process, intrinsic to the 
isotope. 
Second, the reliability of a disposition might be said to be a function of the range of possible 
circumstances in which it issues a manifestation when triggered. The wider the range, the more reliable 
the disposition is. But we think the resulting account of degrees of credit is implausible. Suppose that 
both you and I are competent archers, both in daylight and during the night. We are now shooting in 
broad daylight. However, you are more reliable than me at night, due to having better night vision: you 
would hit the target over a wider range of circumstances in which it is dark. If both of us manifest 
archery competence in hitting the target at midday, it doesn’t seem that your success is more creditable 
to you in virtue of the fact that you are disposed to succeed in a wider range of night-time circumstances 
than I am. While you plausibly are the better archer, that doesn’t matter, since we are interested in 
assessing the token attempt, not whom of us is better at archery. 
We doubt that the degree of credit one earns for a success could depend entirely on general features of 
one’s competences, such as how reliable they are - in either of the senses discussed above. To wrap up, 
it isn’t clear how the manifestation account could make sense of the idea that credit comes in degrees, 
but it is clear that Sosa is committed to both the manifestation account and to the idea that credit comes 
in degrees. In the next section we consider Sosa’s latest account of degrees of credit. 
5. DEGREES OF CREDIT AND SOSA’S HIERARCHY OF ATTEMPTS 
Recall that Sosa holds that there are three levels of knowledge: the animal, reflective and secure 
knowledge. On the animal level the subject’s true belief manifests her competence to believe the truth. 
On the reflective level the subject manifests a meta-competence to judge well, and gains credit for the 
aptness (not just the truth) of her first-order belief. On the level of secure knowledge the subject attains 
reflective knowledge through competences retained safely. But it’s not just that one is creditable for 
different things – for instance, in the case of animal knowledge, for true belief, and in the case of 
reflective knowledge, for apt belief. Sosa’s thought seems to be that as one ascends up the hierarchy, 
one deserves more credit for one’s true belief: 
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What unifies these three levels of our hierarchy, as distinct levels of human knowledge, is that 
on these levels the thinker attains an epistemic success (truth, or aptness) attributable to them, 
as really their own doing. Coordinately, such success corresponds decreasingly to adventitious 
external luck. This holds good all along the ascent of attitudes from the animal level of the 
merely apt, to the reflective-full-well level of the fully apt, to the securely reflective-full-well 
level attained through competences retained safely and not just by luck: i.e., competences that 
would not too easily have been missing. (Sosa forthcoming, p. 176) 
We take the view to be that the higher up the hierarchy I ascend, the more credit I deserve for the truth 
of my belief, and the less lucky (in the telically pertinent sense) it is that my belief is true. Full, luck-
excluding credit requires that one’s knowledge be secure.   
Given Sosa’s performance normative framework, this tripartite hierarchy of knowledge is an instance 
of a general hierarchy of attempts: an attempt can be apt, reflectively apt, or secure. And so the general 
thought is that the degree of credit one deserves for a success depends on how high one ascends this 
hierarchy: to attain full credit for a success, one’s success must be secure. If we take Sosa’s idea that 
credit is tantamount to a kind of responsibility (in the sense of attributability) at face value, it follows 
that one is more responsible for a success – it is more attributable to one, more one’s own doing – the 
higher up one’s attempt places in the hierarchy.13 
Let’s look a bit more closely at secure attempts, which is the newest element in Sosa’s framework. 
According to Sosa having a complete competence (a so-called SSS-competence) requires having a seat 
of the competence while being in the right kind of shape and situation (see footnote 7 for more details). 
On Sosa’s view, the attainment of secure performance requires that one’s SSS (Situation, Shape, Skill) 
-competence is safe in the following way: one could not easily have failed to retain one’s SSS-
competence, while still making the same (or, perhaps, a relevantly similar) attempt. Hence, security 
does not require that the retaining of one’s SSS-competence be safe. For instance, if one’s life is in 
danger, then the retaining of one’s SSS-competence is, of course, in danger. Yet, a pilot in grave danger 
of being shot down can come to have secure knowledge: they are safe from losing their SSS-competence 
while still retaining a disposition to make judgments regarding a relevant question even in the absence 
of the complete competence (Sosa forthcoming, p. 161). The contrast case considered by Sosa is that of 
Simone, a fighter pilot who, unbeknownst to her, is routinely tested under simulation. Simone, Sosa 
                                               
13  Even if credit is a kind of responsibility, we are not sure how Sosa’s framework could be extended into a 
general theory of responsibility. I can be responsible for doing something badly, for making a mistake, or for an 
omission – for instance, for forgetting to answer an important email. Incompetent actions and omissions can, it 
seems, be attributable to me, but they are not manifestations of competence. Many thanks to Ninni Suni for 
discussion.  
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assumes, could easily have been under such a simulation, in which case the situational component of 
her SSS-competence would have been missing. When she judges, for instance, that she is flying over a 
lake, she lacks secure knowledge, for she could easily have made this judgment even while lacking her 
complete SSS-competence. While Simone can have animal and reflective knowledge, she lacks secure 
knowledge. 
Should we agree, then, that a success becomes more creditable to a subject in the sense of being more 
attributable to her in virtue of the fact that it is not only apt, but reflectively apt and secure? Our worry 
is that the resulting view makes degrees of credit – and hence, degrees of responsibility in the sense of 
attributability – dependent on the wrong kinds of facts. We think an agent who retains her competences 
in an insecure way can be fully responsible for her actions. Consider the following example: 
Poisoned Apple 
Malla has decided to kill Saana by giving her a poisoned apple. But she must first mix the 
poison. To manufacture a potent enough poison, she must mix 10 ingredients in the right 
quantities. She sets out to do so, putting in just the right number of drops of each ingredient 
using a pipette. However, the lights in the room are highly unreliable, occasionally gradually 
dimming in a slow, imperceptible manner. Had the lights been dimmer, Malla would not have 
been able to count the right number of drops of each ingredient – as a result, the quantities 
would not have been precise enough, and the concoction not potent enough to kill Saana. But 
as it happens, the lights work perfectly, and Saana is poisoned by Malla’s apple.   
In this case, Malla does not safely retain the situational component of her complete SSS-competence to 
poison Saana: there are modally nearby cases in which she attempts to poison Saana even though she 
lacks the complete competence to do so. Yet, this doesn’t make Malla any less responsible for poisoning 
Saana – poisoning Saana is no less Malla’s own doing. How reliable the lights are in the room where 
Malla mixes her poisons just seems irrelevant when thinking about issues of attributability and 
responsibility here. And as we saw at the outset, responsibility, in the sense of attributability, is plausibly 
connected to attributions of praise and blame: if an agent is not responsible for an action, then she cannot 
properly be blamed or praised for the action, since it wasn't really their doing. But Malla is no less 
blameworthy because she could easily have botched up her concoction due to malfunctioning lighting. 
Note that these points are not confined to cases involving responsibility for actions that are morally 
wrong. Consider the following case: 
            Depth Perception 
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Halti sees a child drowning in a river. Luckily there is a lifebuoy by the bank that she can throw 
to the child, though to throw it far enough she must precariously balance herself in a dangerous 
place above some sharp rocks. Halti does so, successfully throwing the buoy to the child, who 
then grabs it and is saved. However, Halti’s eyesight is very sensitive to moisture: when the air 
is as moist as it is here, right by the roaring river, her depth perception is severely affected in 
about 50% of cases. Halti cannot tell when it is and isn’t affected. Had her eyesight been 
affected, she would have misjudged the location of the child, throwing the buoy in the wrong 
place.  
Consider Halti’s competence to save the child, which essentially involves a competence to act quickly 
enough, throwing the buoy to the child. Her SSS-competence is not safe, for had her eyesight been 
affected, she would have lost the shape component of her competence to throw the buoy. Nevertheless, 
she would still have made an attempt to save the child, throwing the buoy at the location she would then 
have falsely believed to be that of the child. Does the fact that her eyesight is precarious in this way 
make her any less creditable or responsible for saving the child? Does it make her less praiseworthy; 
does it make her action less morally worthy? We think not. Halti is every bit as creditable for saving 
the child as someone with no such moisture-sensitive defect in their eyesight; indeed, the defect in 
question just simply seems irrelevant for issues of credit, responsibility, praise, and moral worth.14 
The reader might here demur at our talk of moral responsibility and worth, given Sosa’s focus on telic 
normativity. Even though Sosa is clear that the kind of credit he is interested in is a matter of 
responsibility in the sense of attributability, the responsibility at issue, as such, is not moral: one can 
deserve telic credit for morally good, neutral, or bad actions. Could Sosa reply that he is only interested 
in a kind of responsibility that is not moral – and, perhaps, that the cases we’ve been pressing seem 
convincing because they elicit moral evaluations? Whereas moral responsibility is intricately tied with 
our practices of morally praising and blaming agents, there are also practices of praising and blaming 
that are not moral. Indeed, a coach’s praise on one of her players need not in any way be moral. 
Similarly, one might think that as one ascends up Sosa’s knowledge hierarchy, different grades (and 
possibly kinds) of epistemic praise are appropriate. 
                                               
14 Many theories in epistemology relativise knowledge or justification - and epistemic assessment more generally 
- to a basis or ways of believing: we are interested in evaluating how well the subject does given that she believes 
on a given basis, whether thought of in terms of the evidence or reasons the belief is based on, or the method 
deployed. Whether the subject would have believed something false, for instance, had her belief been differently 
based, seems simply irrelevant. For Sosa the relevant ways of believing are a matter of which competences are 
manifested in believing. By requiring security the assessment of the performance is no longer constrained to 
considering cases where the ‘basis’ is held fixed.   
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Credit in Sosa’s sense is not, of course, tantamount to moral responsibility. Nevertheless, we think it 
would be theoretically disappointing to wholly detach moral responsibility – which is necessary for 
morally crediting, praising, and blaming – from other kinds of responsibility. After all, we need to say 
what unites different kinds of responsibility – what makes them all kinds of responsibility (at least in 
the sense of attributability). Perhaps even more pertinently, it is not clear if Sosa’s axiological 
framework can be thus detached from the realm of moral evaluation, given its general nature (often also 
taken to be a main selling point). After all, in evaluating Halti our interest may be in how creditable 
Halti is for the success of doing the morally right thing. And on Sosa’s virtue-theoretic picture, this will 
be a matter of Halti’s competences bearing an appropriate relation to her moral success (e.g. of the 
success manifesting her competence). But isn’t being creditable for doing the right thing exactly what 
morally worthy action is?  
Another possible reply to our argument might be that we are rarely concerned with the degree of credit 
afforded by security: aptness and reflective aptness are almost always enough.15 Yet, for security not to 
be an idle dangler with little theoretical work to do, we should be able to imagine situations in which 
precarious eyesight makes a difference for credit and responsibility. But we have a hard time imagining 
such cases. Even more importantly, we think a theory of moral worth, for instance, on which such 
factors could make a difference would be wrong: a practice that praises agents with stellar eyesight 
more for saving children would simply be misguided, being sensitive to factors irrelevant for such moral 
evaluations.    
Sosa suggests a view of degrees of credit appealing to a hierarchy of attempts. The higher one ascends 
up the hierarchy – from apt to reflectively apt and secure – the more credit one deserves for a success. 
We have argued, however, that the resulting view makes degrees of credit depend on the wrong kinds 
of facts. For now we set these considerations aside and accept for the sake of argument that degrees of 
credit can be understood within the manifestation account. In the next section we will argue that the 
Cake Theory has problematic consequences. 
6. PROBLEMS FOR THE CAKE THEORY 
A problem with the Cake Theory that we have already gestured toward is the way in which it divides 
factors responsible for a success into two groups: an agent’s competence, and everything else. All 
factors belonging to the second group are treated on a par, as constituting a kind of luck that detracts 
from the attributability of a success. As we see things, this is the reason why cases of testimonial 
knowledge are troublesome for virtue epistemological theories of knowledge that assume the Cake 
Theory. In such cases credit for true belief has to be shared, and often the testifier is more responsible 
                                               
15 See Sosa’s remarks (forthcoming, p. 171). 
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for the truth of the belief than the receiver of the testimony. But sharing epistemic credit with someone 
with whom you cooperate in order to know, as in testimonial cases, is not incompatible with knowing: 
a good testifier does not render the truth of one’s belief lucky. The Cake Theory is insensitive to this 
difference. 
One initially promising way to respond to this problem is to claim that in cases where one gains 
knowledge through cooperation credit is not shared in the first place, since the success is not attributable 
to any single agent, but to a cooperating group of agents. Indeed, Greco (2018, pp. 280-281) has argued 
that testimonial knowledge should be understood as a joint achievement that is attributable to the joint 
agency partially constituted by the speaker and the hearer. Greco holds that cooperative knowledge 
generation, say within a research team, also involves joint agency. The guiding idea here seems to be 
that if a success is attributable to joint agency, in which one competently participates in, then the 
contributions of different agents don't compete for credit, and hence cases of testimonial knowledge are 
not problematic. Sometimes a success is creditable to an individual agent and sometimes to a joint 
agency.  
Greco rightly recognizes that such a view requires rejecting the idea that knowledge is true belief 
attributable to the cognitive abilities of the agent. There are, Greco thinks, two ways of knowing: ”First, 
one may come to know by means of one’s individual competent agency. Second, one may come to 
know by means of one’s competent participation in competent joint agency. In the second case, it is 
important to note, one’s having a true belief is attributable to the competent joint agency, as opposed to 
one’s competent participation in that joint agency” (Greco 2018, p. 281). 
However, the actions of two agents who work in tandem are not trivially manifestations of joint agency. 
Drawing on the work of Searle, Bratman and Gilbert, Greco (2018, p. 280) holds that joint agency 
involves at least four features: 
(i)  a we intention, that is, an intention to participate in some activity and understand it as something 
they do together, 
(ii) the sharing of some set of sub-plans, 
(iii) interaction, in that what one member does affects what the others do, and, 
(iv) interdependence, in that what is done together cannot be done alone, at least in the same way.  
We think that an agent can gain a sufficient degree of credit for a success even in cases in which another 
agent is responsible for the success to a high degree, and the above conditions for joint agency are not 
satisfied. Consider for instance the following case: 
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Paternalism 
There’s a lot of misleading information about the origin of Covid-19 available. You know that 
your child is keen to find out how Covid-19 emerged, and that she would easily be misled by 
false conspiracy theories. Without telling your child, you block all the sites where she could 
encounter misleading information about Covid-19. If you hadn’t blocked the bad sites, your 
child would almost certainly have ended up believing falsehoods. But thanks to your pre-
emptive actions, she encounters only genuine information, and consequently comes to know 
that Covid-19 has a natural animal origin. 
You are for a large part responsible for your child’s true belief, and it is clear that there is no we-
intention in this case. Your child might even explicitly believe that you didn’t meddle in her 
investigation. Yet your paternalistic actions don’t rob your child of knowledge. While appeal to joint 
agents might help the virtue epistemologist deal with standard cases of testimony, it doesn’t seem to get 
to the gist of the problem. 
Virtue theorists might reply that the notion of joint agency is too strict, and that competences can be 
possessed by collectives that don’t constitute joint agents. Sosa (2007, pp. 93-94) gestures towards this 
kind of view. Testimonial knowledge might be gained from manuscripts written long ago, and in such 
cases the collective responsible for the knowledge is not organized and its members certainly don’t have 
the required kind of we-intention, since some parties might be dead. In some such cases, though 
individuals only deserve partial credit for a success, the credit might be enough at least for animal 
knowledge (Sosa 2007, p.97).  
But if nothing like genuine joint agency is required, then our worry is that agents who have no intention 
of helping someone in F-ing can be partially responsible for the fact that someone successfully F’s. 
Suppose that instead of trying to keep her promise in Tokyo Metro, Aino’s aim is to blow up Shibuya 
station, which she succeeds in doing. If no shared intention is required in order to share credit for a 
success, then the friendly locals who provided Aino with directions to the station appear to get at least 
partial telic credit for the horrendous deed: Aino’s success appears to be at least partially attributable to 
them. Moreover, recall that Sosa thinks of such attributability in terms of responsibility. But we think 
it is implausible that the locals are responsible for the blowing up of the station. Moreover - recalling 
the connection between responsibility and blame - the friendly locals surely cannot be blamed for the 
attack on the station, and neither do they need an excuse for having helped Aino. 
Instead of invoking the idea of joint agents or looser collectives, virtue reliabilists might suggest - 
drawing on the idea of joint manifestations of dispositions - that credit is fully attributable to all the 
contributing parties if the success is the joint manifestation of the competences of the contributing 
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parties.16 The idea would be that two dispositions can jointly manifest themselves in a single success, 
and in such cases both can be fully (or at least sufficiently) responsible for the success. It does not 
follow, however, that these two dispositions must constitute a competence (had by some sort of 
collective). (Figuring out whether the resulting view is compatible with the Cake Theory is something 
we leave as an exercise to the reader.) 
The joint manifestation account may be able to accommodate Paternalism, assuming that a case could 
be made for thinking both your and your child’s competences are jointly manifested in the true belief 
of your child. It delivers the right verdict in the version of Tokyo Metro where Aino blows up the station, 
since plausibly the passerby’s competences are not manifested in Aino’s blowing up of the station, 
though they may be manifested in her arriving at the station in time. It may also be able to give the 
correct verdict in the following kind of case: 
 Methanol and Ethanol 
While hiking in the woods Olos encounters a man who suffers from severe methanol poisoning. 
Olos knows that methanol poisoning is treated by ingesting ethanol. Olos has a pocket mat with 
him and gives it to the man. But he knows that the amount of ethanol it contains is not sufficient, 
so after giving the man the pocket mat he runs for help. A few minutes later Ounas, who knows 
nothing of Olos, encounters the poor chap, recognizes that he suffers from methanol poisoning, 
and gives him the small dose of ethanol she carries in her pocket mat. But Ounas knows that 
the amount of alcohol she had isn’t sufficient to cure a severe case of methanol poisoning, and 
runs for help. Neither Olos nor Ounas can find any help, but their combined effort cures the 
man’s methanol poisoning, and he doesn’t lose his sight. 
In Methanol and Ethanol Olos and Ounas deserve equal credit for curing the man, and intuitively their 
actions are equally morally worthy. Moreover, perhaps we can view the success (curing the man) as a 
joint manifestation of their relevant competences. So the joint manifestation account might be able to 
deliver the right verdict here. But alter the case slightly and it delivers the wrong verdict. Hold 
everything about Ounas fixed, but assume that Olos is incompetent and knows nothing about how to 
cure methanol posioning. Suppose, for instance, that he falsely thinks that water would help the poor 
chap, and falsely, though perhaps justifiably, believes that his pocket mat contains water. Consequently, 
curing the man from methanol poisoning cannot be the joint manifestation of Olos’ and Ounas’ 
competences, since Olos is incompetent. Yet, Olos’ actions are partially responsible for Ounas’ success, 
since she wouldn’t have been able to cure the man had Olos not given the man ethanol. Therefore, 
                                               
16 Molnar (2003), for instance, talks of joint manifestations of numerous dispositions (though not of dispositions 
of numerous different objects or agents).  
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according to the joint manifestation account, Ounas deserves less credit for the success if Olos is 
incompetent than if he is competent. But whether Olos is competent strikes us as completely irrelevant 
to how much credit Ounas deserves for the success. Similarly, her action is equally morally worthy 
irrespective of whether Olos is competent. So the joint manifestation account cannot be correct. 
In the beginning of this section we flagged as problematic the way in which the Cake Theory treats the 
contributions of other agents to one’s success (as in cases of testimony) on a par with environmental 
contributions that may - at least in many cases - plausibly be thought of as introducing an element of 
luck. But we think the problem with the Cake Theory runs deeper. The deeper problem is the way in 
which contributions of other factors are thought to always detract from the credit deserved by an agent. 
This is the core idea of the Cake Theory, as expressed by its second tenet: 
(2) The degree to which a success is creditable to an agent A is a function of the degree to which 
A’s competence, as opposed to other factors, is responsible for the success. 
Indeed, we don’t think it is important that the extra amount of ethanol received by the poisoned man 
has its source in the intentional actions of another agent. Had the man ended up ingesting some extra 
ethanol due to some bizarre chain of events not connected with the actions of agents, Ounas would still 
have deserved credit for saving the man from methanol poisoning. In short, we think the Cake Theory 
identifies the wrong facts as those grounding degrees of credit. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We’ve argued that extant virtue epistemological views are intricately connected to the Cake Theory of 
credit, and that the second tenet of the Cake Theory is false. Factors external to one’s agency may be 
responsible for a success even to a significant degree without detracting from the credit one deserves 
for the success. We have given cases in which multiple agents each deserve a high degree of credit for 
a single success. But the Cake Theory, due to its structure, rules out such cases. Recall, for instance, the 
case Methanol and Ethanol, in which Olos and Ounas save a man from methanol poisoning. We don’t 
think that Olos, for instance, deserves any less credit for saving the man in the case we described than 
in a different one in which he carries a slightly larger pocket mat, one big enough to contain just enough 
ethanol to save the man even without the help of Ounas.  
But if the degree of credit an agent deserves for a success isn’t a function of how responsible the agent’s 
competences, as opposed to other factors, are for the success, then what is it a function of? Here we 
lack the space to develop a full-fledged theory. Instead we offer some desiderata that theories of credit 
ought to satisfy, and gesture in what we see as the right direction. 
A theory of credit should: 
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(i) make sense of the idea that credit can come in degrees, 
(iii) allow for credit to be shared in a way that does not detract from the degree of credit 
deserved by the involved parties, and, 
(iii) be applicable outside epistemology. 
In the case of (iii) we have, in particular, in mind the common view on which morally worthy action is 
a matter of being creditable for doing the morally right thing. In addition to these three desiderata, many 
virtue epistemologists hold that we can give an account of knowledge in terms of credit: knowledge is 
creditable true belief, a sufficient amount of credit ruling out the kind of luck that is incompatible with 
knowledge. Though we think the notion of credit has important work to do in epistemology, we doubt 
that knowledge is creditable true belief. Indeed we think there are cases of knowledge that don’t involve 
manifesting competences to believe truly -- or, indeed, competences to know.17 
We think virtue epistemologists are right in attempting to ground facts about credit in properties of 
agents: for a success to be attributable to an agent, after all, it must be suitably connected to something 
pertaining to the agent. We don’t, however, have to think of the relevant properties as competences, 
thought of as dispositions succeed. Instead, they might simply be the dispositions manifested by an 
agent, dispositions manifesting themselves as the relevant attempt (the forming of a belief, performing 
of an action, etc.). Further, we think the most promising way of thinking about the kind of luck or 
accidentality at issue, one incompatible with credit and attributability, is modal. Start with the rough 
and ready idea that an agent deserves credit for a success S (in a case c) if there is a modally robust 
connection within some relevant set of cases between manifesting the dispositions that the agent 
manifests (in c) and S. (Obviously the dispositions that enter the explanation here cannot be dispositions 
to S, since a disposition to S cannot have non-S-ings as its manifestations.) However, we need not think 
of the relevant cases as ones that are modally close. 
One way to fill in the details, defended in Lasonen-Aarnio (forthcoming), takes as its starting point the 
contrast between being a fluke, coincidence, or accident, on the one hand, and having an explanation, 
on the other. A success that is attributable and hence, creditable, to an agent must depend in a specific 
way on the dispositions manifested by the agent. In particular, there must be an explanatory 
generalization connecting the dispositions and success, a generalization that explains the token success. 
The account is broadly modal, for explanatory generalizations must be sufficiently invariant across 
                                               
17 See Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) and Hirvelä (2018) on knowing without credit for true belief, and Hirvelä (2019b) 
and Lasonen-Aarnio (2021, forthcoming) for knowing without having the competence to do so. 
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cases involving different interventions and background conditions (cf. Woodward (2003)).18 In sum, 
for a success S to be creditable to an agent, there must be a sufficiently modally robust, invariant 
connection between the dispositions manifested by the agent and S, a connection that explains the fact 
that S occurs on this occasion.19 On such a view, the degree of credit the subject deserves depends on 
how robust the generalization is, and/or how well it explains the token success. 
Another way to cash out the rough and ready idea would be to maintain that credit is a function of how 
characteristic, or typical, F-ing, in the way in which S actually F’s, is as a manifestation of the 
dispositions that the agent manifests. On this view F-ing would be a typical or characteristic 
manifestation of a set of dispositions D, only if there is some normal world where the D manifests as 
F-ing when triggered.20 The larger the set of normal worlds across which D manifests as F-ing when 
triggered the more typical or characteristic F-ing is as the manifestation of D. 
We could then maintain that if the dispositions that the agent manifests in believing p typically manifest 
as knowledge, and S knows that p, then her knowing p would be creditable to her. An agent would 
deserve credit for doing what is morally right if the dispositions that they manifest in doing what is 
morally right normally would result in doing what is morally right in their circumstances. The degree 
of credit an agent deserves for F-ing would be a function of how large the set of normal worlds across 
which the dispositions that the agent manifests manifest as F-ing when triggered. 
These are vague suggestions, but they do look promising with respect to the desiderata we laid down in 
that they might allow us to share our cake and have it too. 
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18 We should be very cautious about drawing conclusions from successful causal explanations to claims involving 
quantitative causal notions, such as claims about the magnitude of the total effect of one variable on another, or 
claims about comparative causal relevance--indeed, Woodward (2003: 38) notes that his approach has nothing to 
say about such quantitative causal notions.  
19 Various things can interfere with one’s success, and in any case some cooperation from the environment (and 
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relativity break down when quantum gravitational effects become important. 
20 For use normal worlds see for instance M. Smith (2016) and Goodman and Salow (2018). 
23 
funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research 
and innovation programme under grant agreement No 758539. 
REFERENCES 
Baehr, J. (2012). Credit Theories and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly, 62(246), 1-22. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.698.x 
Bradford, G. (2015). Knowledge, Achievement, and Manifestation. Erkenntnis, 80(1), 97-116. 
doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9614-0 
Carter, J. A. (2016). Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti-Luck Epistemology: A New Solution. Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly, 97(1), 140-155. doi:10.1111/papq.12040 
Gaultier, B. (2014). Achievements, Safety and Environmental Epistemic Luck. Dialectica, 68(4), 477-
497. doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12081 
Goodman, J., & Salow, B. (2018). Taking a chance on KK. Philosophical Studies, 175(1), 183-196. 
doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0861-1 
Greco, J. (2003). Knowledge as Credit for True Belief. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Intellectual 
Virtue: Perspectives from Ethis and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Greco, J. (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Greco, J. (2016). Knowledge, Virtue, and Safety. In M. A. Fernández Vargas (Ed.), Performance 
Epistemology - Foundations and Applications (pp. 51-61). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Greco, J. (2018). Virtue, Knowledge, and Achievement. In The Routledge Handbook of Virtue 
Epistemology: Routledge. 
Hirvelä, J. (2018). On Virtue, Credit and Safety. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 95(1), 98-120.  
Hirvelä, J. (2019a). Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths. Synthese, 196(3), 1167-1186. 
doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1511-z 
Hirvelä, J. (2019b). Knowing Without Having The Competence to Do So. Thought: A Journal of 
Philosophy, 8(2), 110-118. doi:10.1002/tht3.411 
Hirvelä, J. (2020). No Safe Haven For The Virtuous. Episteme, 17(1), 48-63.  
Hirvelä, J., & Paterson, N. J. (2021). Need knowing and acting be SSS-Safe? Thought: A Journal of 
Philosophy, 10(2), 127-134. doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.487 
Kelp, C. (2017). Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology. In A. Carter, E. Gordon, & B. Jarvis (Eds.), 
Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind (pp. 224-245). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lackey, J. (2007). Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know. Synthese, 158(3), 345-361. 
doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9044-x 
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2010). Unreasonable Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1), 1-21.  
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2021). Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat. In J. Brown & M. Simion (Eds.), 
Reasons, Justification and Defeat (pp. 93-115). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (forthcoming). Perspectives and Good Dispositions. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research.  
Littlejohn, C. (2014). Fake Barns and False Dilemmas. Episteme-a Journal of Individual and Social 
Epistemology, 11(4), 369-389. doi:10.1017/epi.2014.24 
Miracchi, L. (2014). Getting Things Done. (Ph.D. Thesis), Rutgers University,  
Miracchi, L. (2015). Competence to Know. Philosophical Studies, 172, 29-56.  
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers:A Study in Metaphysics: A Study in Metaphysics (Vol. 72): Oxford 
University Press. 
Prior, E. W., Pargetter, R., & Jackson, F. (1982). Three theses about dispositions. American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 19(3), 251-257.  
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pritchard, D. (2010). Knowledge and Understanding. In D. Pritchard, A. Millar, & A. Haddock (Eds.), 
The Nature and Value of Knowledge (pp. 5-88). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pritchard, D. (2012). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy, 109(3), 247-279.  
24 
Riggs, W. (2002). Reliability and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 64, 79-96.  
Sliwa, P. (2016). Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
93(2), 393-418.  
Smith, A. M. (2015). Responsibility as Answerability. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Philosophy, 58(2), 99-126.  
Smith, M. (2016). Between Probability and Certainty - What Justifies Belief. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Sober, E. (1988). Apportioning Causal Responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy, 85(6), 303-318. 
doi:10.2307/2026721 
Sosa, E. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge: Volume I. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Sosa, E. (2009). Reflective Knowledge: Apt belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sosa, E. (2015). Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sosa, E. (forthcoming). Epistemic Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Turri, J. (2011). Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved. Philosophers Imprint, 11(8), 1-11.  
Watson, G. (1996). Two Faces of Responsibility. Philosophical Topics, 24(2), 227-248.  
Vetter, B. (2016). Are abilities dispositions? Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1152-7 
Woodward, J. (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation: Oxford University 
Press. 
Zagzebski, L. (1994). The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174), 65-73.  
 
